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This article discusses the impact of neoliberal ideologies of security governance on the 
customary laws of armed conflict, and describes how neoliberal practices of privatisation, 
outsourcing,  and  risk  management  within  the  security  sector  have  facilitated  the 
legalisation of atrocities. Neoliberal mentalities of governance have significantly impacted 
military administration in combat operations by decentralising control, by promoting 
discretion and freedom of action down the chain-of-command, and by institutionalising 
intent-based orders and standing Rules of Engagement. In so doing, the military has 
shifted the criteria for attack from one based upon an individual's status as a combatant to 
one  of  defining  and  containing  risky  populations.  Whether  used  to  justify  counter-
insurgent strikes in Iraq or Afghanistan, military intervention in Libya, or protest policing 
of the Arab Spring, neoliberalised security governance is designed to be waged not against 
States  and  regular  combatants,  but  against  'failed  States'  and  'non-State  actors' 
participating in activities, often political, that authorities perceive as threatening. This 
article provides a theoretical and historical discussion of what is at stake in such a logic, 
and illustrates its operation through reference to the intentional killing of civilians in Iraq 
depicted  in  the  12  July  2007  video  made  public  by  WikiLeaks.  It  argues  that  the 
ideologies and practices of neoliberalism in the security sector are not only facilitating 
such killings, but are in fact facilitating their justification as lawful, thereby normalising 
civilian atrocities within the laws of armed conflict in ways that can be described as 
distinctly imperial.  How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction    
 
Certain  practices  of  contemporary  warfare,  such  as  pre-emptive  attacks  on  civilians, 
house clearings, air strikes in residential neighbourhoods, targeted killings, and attacks on 
medical personnel and providers of humanitarian assistance, have become increasingly 
common in the War on Terror, in protest policing, and in counter-insurgent and urban 
warfare.  This  article  will  discuss  the  ways  in  which  the  ideologies  and  practices  of 
neoliberal governance in the security sector are not only facilitating such practices, but are 
in fact facilitating their justification as lawful within the customary laws of armed conflict. 
Moreover, these are practices that until recently were denounced as atrocities and even 
prosecuted as war crimes. To a certain extent, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
modern States have ordinarily sought to normalise the atrocities that their security forces 
commit against civilians, preferring to use the language and logic of the law whenever 
possible to justify such actions. However, there is a distinct pattern to the tactics that are 
being normalised today, and this is due in part to the widespread adoption of neoliberal 
ideologies of governance and administration within the security sector. This is enabling 
the U.S. and its allies to institute what Agamben (2005) has discussed as a permanent 
state of exception within the ordinary law, and the normalisation of atrocity is a key 
component of this.  
  The post-war period has seen an increase in attention to war crimes and the 
codification of the laws of war, and this has given us such instruments as the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, and the United Nations Responsibility to Protect 
Protocol (UN Res., 2009), as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
which continues to address pressing issues in humanitarian law (Melzer, 2008). At the 
same time, though, the neoliberalisation of security governance is significantly weakening 
protections  for  civilians  by  permitting  and  justifying  attacks  against  them  as  being 
customary under the laws of armed conflict. There is very little that international law 
would  have  to  offer  such  civilians  if  the  harms  they  suffer  are  rendered  lawful  as 
customary practices of war. Yet, this is indeed what is happening, and one can canvass the 
above strategies and perceive that their impact on their target populations consists not 
only of intentional deaths, but also injuries, mayhem, and widespread social dislocations 
that serve to further fracture and marginalise such populations. Whether they are used to 
justify counter-insurgent strikes in Iraq or Afghanistan, military intervention in Libya, or 
protest  policing  in  regimes  experiencing  the  Arab  Spring,  the  strategies  of  what 
Abrahamsen  and  Williams  (2011)  have  termed  “globalised  security  governance”  are 
designed to be waged not against states and lawful combatants, but against 'failed States' 
and 'non-State actors' – categories that are essentially euphemisms for civilians. The 
present article focuses on the neoliberal ideologies embedded within globalised security Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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governance, arguing that these are having serious negative impacts on the development 
of  civil  institutions  and  political  mobilisation  within  a  societies  already  fractured  by 
conflict. Moreover, this development further reinforces the political power of the military 
hegemons that wield these strategies – whether these are the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
NATO in Libya, or United Nations peacekeepers on the borders of Kosovo and Serbia.  
  The article will first review the orthodox thinking concerning the customary 
laws of armed conflict, particularly the traditional 'two element' theory that posits that 
customary norms can be determined by examining the elements of actual state practice 
and the state's opinio juris that the norm is a legally binding one. It will then present 
critical alternatives to this view, which posit that customary law is a kind of discursive 
practice, where customary laws emerge from the overarching normative and ideological 
framework within which customary norms are articulated and by reference to which they 
are justified. The second section then describes how neoliberal ideologies of governance 
have  shifted  the  normative  framework  within  which  we  understand  and  justify  the 
customary  laws  of  war,  and  focuses  in  particular  on  how  neoliberal  ideologies  of 
management  have  radically  decentralised  and  disaggregated  the  traditional  military 
chain-of-command.  It  is  argued  that  neoliberal  ideologies  of  individualisation, 
privatisation, and strategies of risk management are used to promote the use of force 
against  civilians  as  seemingly  legitimate  acts  of  'self-defence'  against  unknown  and 
unknowable risks – risks that emerge from  a conflict  zone  which  the actions of the 
security forces themselves have rendered endemically dangerous. The third section will 
then  illustrate  this  logic  at  work  through  reference  to  a  specific  case  of  atrocities 
committed against civilians, using the example of Collateral Murder, which is a piece 
video footage that was recorded by the U.S. First Air Cavalry Brigade in Iraq on 12 July 
2007. This footage, which was released in April 2010 by WikiLeaks, depicts the killing of 
civilians, including civilians who were collecting bodies and aiding the wounded. This 
case study will then be supplemented by a range other examples which illustrate how 
justifications for civilian atrocities are becoming increasingly widespread throughout the 
security sector. The argument that I wish to make is not that such acts are illegal under 
the normative framework of the customary laws of war, but instead that this normative 
framework itself is being shifted by neoliberal strategies of security governance in such a 
way as to normalise atrocities within the customary laws of armed conflict.  
  In order to make this argument, I will pull together diverse strands of thinking 
in the nature of customary law, the organising principles of the laws of war, and the 
history of the doctrine of the chain-of-command, and discuss how these have all been 
disaggregated and reconfigured by the neoliberalisation of governance in the security 
sector. The argument that is developed through the grasping together of these strands 
will then be illustrated through reference to the events depicted in Collateral Murder, and 
linked  to  broader  set  of  examples  from  elsewhere  in  the  security  sector,  so  as  to How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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demonstrate the increasing extent to which these norms are shared. In so doing, I will be 
examining the problem of intentional – and seemingly justifiable – civilian atrocities from 
a number of different points of view. More specifically, though, the starting point will be a 
focus on the customary law principle of distinction, which requires that security forces 
distinguish between civilian and military targets. Civilians are liable to attack only for such 
time as they have taken up arms and are actively posing a threat, or if they are part of an 
organized armed group such that they perform a “continuous combat function” (Melzer, 
2008). This article argues that the neoliberalisation of the security sector has shifted the 
criteria for attack from one based upon an individual's status as a combatant to one of 
defining and containing risk. Security forces in global war zones are thus shifting the 
criteria for attack to one in which they use armed force to define and then manage 'risky 
populations' in a way that subverts the ability of the humanitarian law to regulate attacks 
against civilians. Typically, violations of the principle of distinction and the killing of 
civilians  have  been  all-to-commonplace,  calling  into  question  the  ability  of  the 
humanitarian law to play such a regulatory role. However, with the transformations in the 
customary laws of war called into being by the neoliberalisation of security governance, 
what is at stake is not merely the failure of humanitarian law to protect civilians in conflict 
zones, but its increasing use as an instrument of their violent repression.  
 
Critical Perspectives on the Customary Laws of Armed Conflict Critical Perspectives on the Customary Laws of Armed Conflict Critical Perspectives on the Customary Laws of Armed Conflict Critical Perspectives on the Customary Laws of Armed Conflict    
    
Neoliberal ideologies of security governance are transforming the customary laws of war 
and normalising civilian atrocities, not only in the sense that particular strategies are being 
practiced, but in the deeper sense that they are being normalised by security forces as 
being lawful and legitimate practices. Yet changes in the international customary law are 
not possible under orthodox methods of characterising customary law, which require not 
only an objective practice, but also a subjective belief that the practice is a lawful one, to 
both be in existence. This is what Kammerhofer (2004, p. 531) has called the “widely 
held  but  erroneous  belief  which  plagues  state  practice  and  the  nature  of  customary 
international law in general” – i.e. that in traditional customary international law, change 
is not possible. This section will present and critique the orthodox views of customary 
international  law,  and  will  then  proceed  to  summarise  the  literature  concerning  the 
discursive practice view of customary law. It will argue that customary law is an emergent 
phenomenon,  and that the discursive view is therefore the most fruitful method  for 
examining how contemporary customary norms of war are in flux. 
  In contrast to more orthodox views, the discursive view takes the customary 
law to be dynamic; that is to say, it is an unwritten and malleable law that captures the 
morality, politics, and indeed even the prejudices, of the community whose laws and 
customs these are. In this case, the relevant community is the U.S. military, and from here Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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one can see their customs at work in the activities of their partners and allies, such as the 
Coalition forces in Iraq, or the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, 
and increasingly, multi-national peacekeeping forces such  as NATO and the United 
Nations (UN). 
  The traditional sources of international law are outlined by Article 38 of the 
UN Statute of the International Court of Justice, which in turn is derived from the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of Justice of the League of Nations, and includes treaties, general 
principles of law found in municipal legal systems, and customary law. Customary laws 
are founded upon consent and established by actual State practice (usus), as well as a 
State's recognition that the norm is a legally binding one (opinio juris). Within this, 
customary norms can have varying degrees of binding force, ranging from the very low – 
in the form of 'soft law' – to very high, such as in the peremptory norms of jus cogens that 
cannot be derogated from, and in those norms that are binding erga omnes (Besson, 
2010,  p.  172).  These  latter  norms  would  include  grave  breaches  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions, and can be established by formal sources and processes, such as legislative 
enactment  and  treaty  making  (ibid.).  Customary  norms,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
established by informal means, and include “all the moral or social processes by which the 
content of international law is developed” (ibid.).  
  Customary  international  law  has  received  much  recent  attention  from 
academics and legal philosophers, and the nature and constitutive elements of customary 
law  – indeed, even its very existence – remain  contentious  (Roberts, 2001, p.  757). 
Neoliberal  conceptions  of  customary  law,  often  embodied  in  economic  or  game-
theoretical analyses of international law (see Goldsmith & Posner, 2005; Trachtman, 
2008),  and  liberal  internationalist  perspectives  (Rawls,  1993;  Walzer,  2000;  see  also 
Atack, 2005) both argue for the exclusion of politics and values from an analysis of the 
customary international law in favour of self-interest and consent, respectively. Realist 
views of customary international law posit that States in the international arena each 
pursue their own interests, and reject the proposition that there can be an overarching 
normative  regime  that  binds  States  (Goldsmith  &  Posner,  2005).  Such  views  of 
customary international law, as embodied in contemporary doctrines of Political Realism 
and Law and Economics, begin with the claim that States are rational actors and seek only 
to  protect  and  pursue  their  own  self  interest  (ibid.;  see  also  Trachtman,  2008). 
Prescriptive views further posit that states are not only exempt from moral scrutiny, but 
that they ought to be (Orend, 2000, p. 66). Hence, the customary law, to the extent that it 
does exist, is seen by such approaches to rest primarily on political self-interest.  
  Orthodox legal theories of customary international law focus on consent, to be 
found in the rules of recognition for customary legal norms, positing that legally binding 
rules arise when the subjective element of opinio juris, a State's belief in the rule's legally 
binding character, is added to the objective element of usus, or actual State practice. This How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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additive, or 'two element' theory is the orthodox view of customary international law; it is 
the  view  most  often  asserted  by  liberal  internationalist  jurists  and  scholars,  and  has 
generally been affirmed by the International Court of Justice. The main difficulty with the 
orthodox view is that it cannot account for changes in customary norms, let alone for the 
creation of new ones. Certain schools of thought have sought to resolve this difficulty not 
by abandoning the orthodox view, but by instead minimising the ‘practice requirement’ 
in favour of States' opinio juris. This constitutes an attempt to resolve the conceptual 
difficulties inherent to the additive view, including the 'paradox' that for State practices to 
become legal customary norms, a State must begin by acting on the erroneous belief that 
its practices are already legally binding (Lepard, 2010).  
   However, critical scholars of international law have found deeper flaws within 
the orthodox views of customary international law. Koskenniemi traces this to the loss of 
the Grotian, natural law, view of international justice. He states that “[f]rom the simple 
denial of the existence of principles of natural justice – or at least our capacity to know 
them – follow the three liberal principles of social organisation: freedom, equality, and 
the Rule of Law” (Koskenniemi, 1990a, p. 5). To be legal is to be neutral and objective, 
but this obscures the political nature, and the political consequences, of such practices 
and purported justifications (ibid.). In Koskenniemi's view, then, we should abandon the 
orthodox view, not only because there is actually very little in the case law to support such 
a theory (1990b, p. 1948), but more so because at the heart of our construction of the 
customary law is always a worldview, an ideology, and/or an idea about the good life: 
 
We remain just as unable to derive norms from the facts of state behaviour as 
Hume was. And we are just as compelled to admit that everything we know 
about norms which are embedded in such behaviour is conditioned by an 
anterior – though at least in some respects shared – criterion of what is right 
and good for human life. (Koskenniemi, 1990b, p. 1953) 
 
On  this  reading,  we  can  understand  neoliberal  security  governance  as  part  of  an 
overarching and anterior ideology, which is having a powerful effect on the laws and 
customs of war, and that privileges the interests of some human beings over those of 
others in ways that purport to be neutral and objective, but which are in fact nothing of 
the sort. This has the effect of privileging hegemonic interests whose conceptions of the 
law are then backed up through force by means of the strategies of globalised security 
governance. In this way, customary law-making can end up as little more than legislating 
at the end of a truncheon in its purest form, in the sense that the acts of law-making, 
interpretation, and enforcement are collapsed into a single undertaking.  
  While customary law formation is a political activity, it is also a normative one. 
States – and the U.S. in particular – are certainly eager to avail themselves of the Rule of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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Law; yet States themselves have legitimated the body of law known as 'the customary 
laws of armed conflict', imbuing it with the Rule of Law status even as they seek to shape it 
for their own purposes. Accordingly, this article seeks to understand customary law and 
its  consequences  not  in  orthodox  terms,  but  as  a  discursive  practice  in  which  the 
normative force of customs are embodied in and inseparable from the ways in which they 
are practiced and justified. Such a move places the community's values back at the heart 
of a recognisably and deeply political construction of the law. Customary law is not 
expressly made, as with statutes, treaties and case law, but is instead “created and changed 
not by what people say is to be done but by what they do” (Gardiner, 2007, p. 61). In 
Bederman's (2010, p. 113) words, there is really no need to determine which comes first, 
'the practice "chicken", or the recognition "egg"', because customary norms emerge from 
the  social  environment  in  which  they  operate  (see  also  Postema,  2007,  p.  284). 
Koskenniemi too argues that finding a customary norm is a contextual assessment, and 
therefore entails a process of “making contested, political calculations. It is not a rule-
determined  activity,  but  one  which  gives  meaning  to  rules  …  and  which  therefore 
remains external to them' (Koskenniemi, 1990b, p. 1953-4). 
  The discursive view of customary law therefore recognises the self-reflexive 
nature of customary law formation, and suggests a need to analyse customary norm 
generation in a more holistic manner. Agents are not only determining what they think 
and  feel  ought  to  be  done,  but  are  also  determining  what  other  members  of  the 
community  think  and  feel  ought  to  be  done,  with  reference  to  an  interconnected 
framework of shared norms and values. Participants in customary law formation are thus 
“mutually  sanctioning  and  reinforcing”  (Postema,  2007,  p.  289).  It  is  this  that  gives 
customary law its binding force, whether or not any given individual explicitly subscribes 
to the law (ibid., p. 296), and it is this that makes it a public as opposed to a purely private 
endeavour. Individuals, in other words, must reference a framework of interrelated norms 
and meanings in order to guide their deliberations concerning whether a given practice 
ought or ought not to be done. As Postema states, customary rules are not discrete 
practices,  but  “stable  nodes  in  a  dynamic  discursive  network.  Their  existence  and 
normative force depend on their place in this network, and their ability to guide members 
of their community depends on mastery of the deliberative discipline of the practice” 
(ibid., p. 292). Yet those who have mastered the customary laws of armed conflict are 
those who have mastered the discipline of war, and State leaders and diplomats may be 
less  influential  than  the  professional  military  officers  and  ordinary  soldiers  whose 
discipline and practices these are.  
  The creation and transformation of customary laws of armed conflict are thus 
best  understood  through  reference  to  the  overarching  normative  framework  within 
which their practices are elucidated and justified. This includes the institutions of the 
military and security sectors within which parties operate, and their norms governing How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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conduct and discipline; it also includes foundational principles, such as paradigms of 
State sovereignty and State prerogatives, and it includes core institutional values, such as 
comity  and  reciprocity  among  belligerents,  honour  and  courage,  and  how  agents' 
understandings of these values shape what practices are considered consistent with them. 
In other words, the creation and transformation of customary laws must be understood 
through  all  of  the  practices  and  mentalities  of  security  governance.  Understanding 
customary law is therefore not an exercise in defining and applying discrete rules, but 
instead one of elucidating the fundamental values, principles and institutional practices 
that constitute the framework – or the habitus – within which discursive practices arise 
and by reference to which they are justified (Bourdieu, 1977). This includes in particular 
the moral values of the community, which Postema (2007, p. 296) describes as “values so 
fundamental that the community might regard them as defining minimal conditions of 
membership in the community”. Koskenniemi (1990b, p. 1953) echoes this view when 
he suggests that conclusions regarding customary norms simply “appear reasonable and 
coincide  with  our  moral  imagination”.  Yet  for  the  purposes  the  present  paper,  it  is 
important to note that it is precisely this moral imagination, this anterior worldview of 
what is good for  human beings,  that is being  articulated by neoliberal ideology  and 
practice, which is busy creating a new story of the 'good life' and reconfiguring the global 
security  apparatus.  Moreover,  as  Rajagopal  (2006,  p.  149)  has  pointed  out,  such  a 
development effectively raises the “spectre of [a] return to … an ‘imperial’ international 
law which legitimates the exercise of raw power by the US”. 
   
The Normative Framework of Neoliberal Security Governance  The Normative Framework of Neoliberal Security Governance  The Normative Framework of Neoliberal Security Governance  The Normative Framework of Neoliberal Security Governance     
 
On  the  basis  of  the  above  reading,  the  normative  framework  of  neoliberal  security 
governance is at the heart of understanding how and why new customary laws are arising 
within – and being justified by reference to – its overarching structure and normative 
values. This section will first address the privatisation of what was formerly conceived as 
the  application  of  public  force,  which  it  argues  has  fundamentally  altered  the  legal 
justifications of the use of force at the core of the customary laws of war. This privatisation 
has  been  effected  through  the  disaggregation  and  decentralisation  of  the  chain-of-
command, which has placed the responsibility for making decisions to apply force within 
the hands of front-line security providers, such as soldiers, peacekeepers, and private 
contractors, who are all now encouraged to subjectively assess the risks they face in the 
conflict zone, and to defend themselves accordingly. This shift towards risk management 
is a direct result of the assumption of neoliberal ideologies of administration that have 
taken hold of the security sector, which began in the 1980s, but which gained their most 
significant traction after the institution of counter-insurgent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and  the  revolutions  in  military  doctrine  that  govern  them.  Moreover,  it  is  this Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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development that enables a proper understanding of why and how the soldiers of the U.S. 
Air Cavalry Brigade committed the killings in New Baghdad on 12 July 2007. Specifically, 
such a backdrop draws attention not only to how these soldiers were trained to do this, 
but also to the manner in which the military investigators constructed their justifications 
of the killings, and to how these acts were considered lawful under the customary laws of 
armed conflict and the U.S. military’s own Rules of Engagement. Here I focus on the U.S. 
as  the  dominant  military  hegemon  and  leader  in  the  neoliberalisation  of  security 
governance, and then go to argue that from here these strategies are gaining ground in a 
variety of other contexts.  
  Security governance – which may be defined as the institutions, technologies 
and practices that are used to govern security forces and to promote secure environments 
(Johnson  &  Shearing,  2003,  pp.  7-8)  –  emanates  from  the  centres  of  power  and 
embodies many of the values, mentalities of governance, and forms of social ordering of 
the society within which it arises. This in turn gives rise to the institutional and normative 
framework  within  which  the  customary  laws  of  armed  conflict  are  generated  and 
understood. Distinctions between public and private forces, foreign and local forces, as 
well as between military, police, and other State intelligence and national security services 
have all been disaggregated and reassembled into the new global security assemblages 
that are used to enforce security within and against civilian populations (Abrahamsen & 
Williams,  2011).  As  Saskia  Sassen  states,  the  “epochal  transformation  we  call 
globalization  is  taking  place  inside  the  national  to  a  far  larger  extent  than  is  usually 
recognized. It is here that the most complex meanings of the global are being constituted, 
and the national is also often one of the key enablers and enactors of the emergent global 
scale” (Sassen, 2006, p. 1). The globalisation of security governance is therefore not 
merely about the changing nature of the threats posed by weak and failed states and non-
state actors, nor is it simply about the growth of private actors and security companies; 
instead, it concerns the fundamental restructuring of power, mentalities of governance, 
and forms of social ordering that are taking shape in the late modern age.  
  U.S. military doctrine states that building a legitimate political process and 
local capacities for security governance are the core objectives of its counter-insurgency 
strategy,  a  realisation  that  has  been  embodied  in  its  2006  Counterinsurgency  Field 
Manual (Department of the Army, 2006). This has come as a result of military authorities 
reflecting upon their failures to contain insurgent movements in the post-war era despite 
their  military  superiority,  including  particularly  the  failures  of  the  U.S.  military  in 
Vietnam, and subsequently in Lebanon, Somalia and occupied Iraq, as well as the failures 
of  the  French  in  Indochina  and  Algeria  (see  Klein,  2005;  Peterson,  2003).  Military 
authorities  attribute  these  failures  largely  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  tactics  of 
conventional warfare, and to the inability of the military to modernise itself to wage 
unconventional war against non-State actors.  How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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  Yet as in times past, the restructuring of the security sector heralds a shift in the 
broader political and economic structures of society; it is influenced by those shifts at the 
same time that it serves to reinforce them through the strategic use of coercive force. The 
increasing institutionalisation of the strategies of neoliberal security governance, when 
taken  as  a  whole,  indicate  the  emergence  of  new  and  transnational  technologies  of 
political and economic power, which are being employed to shape the broader economic, 
social and normative orders that are emerging alongside of them. This is justified by 
authorities as an attempt to modernise security governance in order to reduce the threats 
posed by terrorists and armed insurgents, yet its overall effects are to justify and increase 
the use of force and coercion against civilian populations. This exposes a fundamental 
inconsistency at the core of globalised security governance and its claims to efficacy: its 
strategies are designed to justify the use of force against non-State actors, i.e. civilians, in 
order to build legitimate governance, yet the prospects of building stable and legitimate 
governance among the civilian population are decreased to the extent that force and 
coercion are deployed against them.  
Here  I  focus  on  the  decentralisation  of  the  chain-of-command  and  on 
strategies of risk management, which I argue are the two facets of neoliberal security 
governance most relevant to the intentional killing of civilians in war zones, and which are 
exemplified by the actions of the Air Cavalry Brigade in Collateral Murder. These serve to 
justify and increase the subjective and pre-emptive use of force in 'self-defense' as a short-
term measure, but in so doing they feed back into a cycle of violence that will necessarily 
supersede the long-term projects of reconstruction, democratisation, and securing the 
well being of the affected community.     
 
The Public Authority Requirement for Making War The Public Authority Requirement for Making War The Public Authority Requirement for Making War The Public Authority Requirement for Making War    
 
In order to understand the role that the decentralisation and disaggregation of the chain-
of-command plays in the justification of atrocities against civilians, it is first necessary to 
understand the public authority requirement in international law. The public authority 
requirement is a direct expression of the state's assumption of the monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force. As such it justifies both the state's exercise of force, as well as the 
laws of war that purport to organise and regulate that use of force, and yet it has been 
significantly reconfigured by the neoliberalisation of security governance. This has been 
accomplished  by  neoliberal  ideologies  of  management  that  have  sought  to  push 
decisions to employ force against civilians down the chain-of-command, and onto front-
line security personnel. This has led to the growth of what are known as 'intent-based' 
orders, orders that only express the goal the security provider is to achieve while leaving 
him or her with the ultimate decision as to how to use initiative to accomplish that goal. 
This, in turn, has led to the increasing institutionalisation of Rules of Engagement, an Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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'intent-based' standing order. These neoliberal innovations in the governance of the use 
of deadly force in conflict zones had their genesis in the post-World War II era. They were 
introduced by the U.S. military in a limited fashion to govern mobile tank warfare, and 
then the air bombing campaigns in the wars first in Korea, and then in Vietnam. Yet they 
began to gain ascendance only in the late 1980s, after neoliberal ideologies of public 
management had become widespread throughout the public service as a whole (see 
Armor, 1988). They have now become the primary method of governing the use of force 
across  the  security  sector,  and  –  since  the  revolution  in  counter-insurgent  warfare 
engendered  by  the  U.S-led  wars  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  –  have  become  the  prime 
method of governing the use of force. Together, the decentralisation of the chain-of-
command combined with strategies of risk management have served to legitimate the 
intentional killing of civilians, and they arise directly out of the neoliberal normative 
framework.  
  International law has long required that only a legitimate public authority can 
initiate and wage war. Once initiated, the in bello use of force is governed by a tightly-
bounded and hierarchical chain-of-command that ensures that the use of force is kept 
within the bounds of this public authority. The public authority requirement is rooted in 
social contract theory, an idea most influentially articulated in the writings of Thomas 
Hobbes. The establishment of security requires a centralised and coercive authority to 
enforce norms and establish order, and citizens agree to be bound by this authority in 
order to free themselves from the violent anarchy of the state of nature (Hobbes, 1962). 
In  this  liberal  view,  public  force  is  morally  justified  because  the  state  is  itself  a  just 
institution – that is to say,  one that  meets the liberal goals  of providing liberty and 
security, and which legitimately represents the collective will. 
  The use of armed force is a “core governance function” (Harel, 2009, p. 2), as it 
involves the exertion of violence in the name of the public (ibid., p. 5). Core governance 
functions must be self-executing, such that state agents do not interpose their own private 
or personal judgment in ways that would strip the act of its public character (ibid.). State 
agents, such as soldiers in the military, must not scrutinise the decisions made by public 
authorities, and for this reason soldiers are trained to be “reflexively obedient” (Osiel, 
1999, p. 3). For a soldier, like an executioner, “[i]t is this blind conformity that makes an 
executioner a public  official in the first place and which also justifies labeling of the 
executioner's acts as  acts  of state” (Harel, 2009, p. 5). If soldiers discard their blind 
obedience to public authority, their acts cease to be acts of state – or acts committed in 
the name of the public – and they are rendered bereft of any moral or legal justification. It 
is  this  ideal  view  that  has  been  used  to  justify  and  to  organise  the  public  authority 
requirement, and the laws of war have hitherto incorporated this principle at their core. 
They are embodied at the national level in the hierarchical and tightly bounded military 
chain-of-command.  How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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The neoliberalisation of the public authority requirement – both as an ideal mechanism 
of organising the use of force, and in terms of the practices which emanate therefrom – 
has significantly impacted the military chain-of-command. The use of military force has 
traditionally been governed by the doctrine of the chain-of-command, which ensured 
that the public authority requirement was embodied in the armed forces of nation States, 
and which eliminated the personal judgment and discretion of soldiers at the front lines. 
The chain-of-command is composed of a series of offices such that each holder is directly 
responsible to, and takes orders from, the office above. The traditional doctrine of the 
chain-of-command requires that it be hierarchical, clear, and unequivocal at all times. 
There must be unity of command in a single, clearly identified commander for each 
operation,  and  there  must  be  continuity  of  command,  with  a  clear  succession  of 
command at all levels (Chief of Defense Staff, 2009, para. 0507).  
  However, significant changes in traditional military administration governing 
the chain-of-command have been shaped and justified by neoliberal and entrepreneurial 
mentalities  of  governance  that  have  gained  influence  since  the  1980s  (Osborne  & 
Gaebler,  1992),  and  have  come  to  be  embodied  in  a  succession  of  management 
philosophies known typically as the New Public Management, but also more recently as 
the New or Networked Governance Management (see e.g. Salmon, 2002; and Hartley, 
2005).  Such  ideologies  of  management  are  themselves  facilitators  of  neoliberal 
globalisation, and are intended to embody the thinking of a “postindustrial, knowledge-
based, global economy” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. xvi). They have led to a wave of 
government  reforms  that  import  techniques  of  business  management  into  public 
administration,  accompanied  by  the  privatisation  of  many  government  functions  to 
promote  efficiency  and  competition.  Neoliberal  governance  is  driven  by  goals  and 
outcomes – or 'missions' (ibid., p. 19 [emphasis in original]) – and not by enforcing strict 
rules and regulations, as it seeks to empower subordinates by decentralising control out 
of  the  hands  of  leaders  and  government  officials  (ibid.;  see  also  Osiel,  1999). 
Entrepreneurial  mentalities  of  governance  ask  that  agents  be  proactive  and  directed 
toward identifying and preventing problems before they emerge (ibid., p. 20). Successful 
'entrepreneurs' in the service of the public are defined by 'the extent to which they define 
risks and contain them' (ibid., p. xx). These neoliberal mentalities of governance have 
significantly impacted military administration in combat operations by decentralising 
control, by promoting discretion and freedom of action down the chain-of-command, 
and by institutionalising intent-based orders and standing Rules of Engagement. Control 
has in this way been disaggregated and spread among various actors, including not only 
ordinary soldiers but also private contractors, and officials within various non-military Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
 
 
42 
government departments and agencies.  
   The  disaggregation  and  decentralisation  of  control  has  transformed  the 
military's own command control structure by pushing decisions to employ force as far 
down the chain-of-command as possible, thus individualising and privatising decisions to 
employ force. Throughout the course of the late twentieth century, the military doctrine 
has grown up that maximum freedom of action must be given to subordinates, and this 
decentralisation of command control has been assisted by the development of 'intent-
based' orders – also called “mission-type” orders – which U.S. doctrine states are now the 
standard form of providing field orders in combat (Department of the Army, Counter-
insurgency Field Manual, 2006, para. 1-145). These orders are often delivered orally, and 
primarily  communicate  the  commander's  intentions,  explaining  the  result  the 
commander wishes subordinates to achieve, rather than what soldiers ought to do or how 
they should accomplish this (ibid.). Intent-based orders were first put into limited use 
during World War II. At that time, field orders generally took the form laid down by the 
nineteenth-century Prussian military, and were characterised by their detailed and exact 
information and minute and precise instructions (Armor, 1988). These generally took 
the  forms  of  the  'five-paragraph  field  order',  which  received  widespread  use  in  the 
militaries of many nation States (ibid.) Exacting instructions were viewed by central 
command authorities as being essential – particularly in the course of waging World War 
I – in which intensive planning and management was required to execute commanders' 
strategies under the conditions of trench warfare, as well as to overcome the limitations of 
inexperienced citizen soldiers (ibid., p. 14). However, the complex and rapidly changing 
tactical situation that characterised the mobile warfare of World War II required that 
somewhat greater freedom and responsibility be placed on small-unit commanders, and 
this  was  then  later  strengthened  by  the  American  counter-insurgency  experience  in 
Vietnam (ibid.).   
  By 1988, the old rationalised system of using clear and detailed five-paragraph 
field orders was becoming obsolete. The timing here is significant. Intent-based orders 
had been in use in some limited form since the mobile warfare of World War II, yet they 
did not begin to become institutionalised within military doctrine until the late 1980s. At 
that time, the U.S. had not been involved in any major counter-insurgent operations for 
over a decade, and so this shift cannot be simply attributed to the military restructuring 
required  to  wage  war  against  non-State  actors.  It  does,  however,  coincide  with  the 
ascendance of neoliberal ideologies of governance throughout the public service as a 
whole that occurred during this period. This transition can be seen in a mobile infantry 
field manual from 1988, which provides one of the earliest formulations of intent-based 
orders within official military doctrine. This early intent-based order states that “Orders 
reflect the commander's intention and will. Indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language 
leads to uncertainty. Subordinates are told in direct and unmistakable terms exactly what How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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the commander wants them to do; they are not normally told how to accomplish it” 
(Department  of  the  Army,  1988,  Appendix  B,  para.  B-2(e)).  Typical  of  neoliberal 
philosophies  of  management,  the  military  has  come  here  to  emphasise  small-unit 
commanders' information, initiative and responsibility, based upon their experience in 
the combat zone (Armor, 1988, p. 15, 22). As we shall see, this has progressed to a far 
greater extent than what was embodied in this early version of an intent-based order, 
allowing for a significant degree of ‘vague and ambiguous language’ and ‘uncertainty’ 
surrounding  the  circumstances  under  which  civilians  can  be  killed  in  order  to  meet 
mission goals.  
  In addition to intent-based orders, the military has made increasing use of 
standing Rules of Engagement to govern the use of force in specific theatres of operation. 
As with intent-based orders, standing Rules of Engagement are drafted broadly so as to 
leave the actual decision of whether or not to employ force with the individual soldier. 
Virtually unknown during World War II, limited use was first made of standing Rules of 
Engagement during the Korean War, and this was undertaken so as to be seen to comply 
with the UN mandate to restrict the conflict and to utilise restrained air power (Perry, 
1999, p. 17). Significant use of Rules of Engagement began to be made during the US air 
bombing campaign in the Vietnam War, due largely to its political fallout (ibid.). They 
have since become the primary means of regulating the use of force in such counter-
insurgency  operations  as  Iraq  and  Afghanistan,  as  well  in  inter-  and  multinational 
peacekeeping operations (ibid.). Standing Rules of Engagement are a natural outgrowth 
of the intent-based system of regulating force – they are essentially intent-based orders 
that ‘stand’ during the course of the operation, and do not need to be modified by a 
commander – and they were originally designed with the goal of making air bombing 
campaigns appear to conform to the laws of armed conflict then in existence.  
   Neoliberal ideologies of management have in this way been incorporated into 
U.S. military doctrine, where their effect has been to institutionalise the decentralisation 
of decision-making by soldiers and commanders in the field. The ideologies of New 
Public  Management  and  New  Governance  Management  have  been  particularly 
influential in the production of the U.S. Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual of 2006 
(Department of the Army, 2006), which provides a substantive re-conceptualisation of its 
doctrine for waging complex irregular warfare, and constitutes what is perhaps one of the 
most significant shifts in military doctrine since the nineteenth century. Similar revisions 
were subsequently adopted in other countries, including the United Kingdom (Ministry 
of  Defence,  2009),  Canada  (Department  of  National  Defence,  2008),  and  Australia 
(Grey, 2009).  
  Intent-based orders and standing Rules of Engagement empower subordinates 
in  the  field  to  make  decisions  to  employ  force  during  counter-insurgency  (COIN) 
operations: Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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Eeffective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders owe it 
to their subordinates to push as many capabilities as possible down to their 
level.  Mission  command  encourages  the  initiative  of  subordinates  and 
facilitates the learning that must occur at every level. It is a major characteristic 
of a COIN force that can adapt and react at least as quickly as the insurgents. 
(Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, para. 1-146).  
 
Perry (1999, p. 13) states of standing Rules of Engagement that they are “intended to be 
used throughout the spectrum of conflict in the absence of any superseding guidance 
from the National Command Authority”. Soldiers are thus being asked to make decisions 
to use lethal force in the absence of supervening command control. The decentralisation 
of governance and the empowering of subordinates to make decisions is a cornerstone of 
neoliberal mentalities of governance, upon which the U.S. military has drawn heavily in its 
recent updates of military doctrine. It is for this reason that the subjective discretion 
embodied  in  intent-based  orders  and  standing  Rules  of  Engagement  are  now 
institutionalised as the primary means of governing the use of force across all divisions of 
the U.S. military (Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, para. 1-
146). 
  The U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that the primary objective of 
any counter-insurgency operation is to foster the development of effective governance by 
a legitimate host government (ibid., para. 1-113). The excessive use of force by counter-
insurgents can weaken the legitimacy of a host government that supports the counter-
insurgency (ibid., para. 1-132). On the other hand, the use of force in counter-insurgency 
operations is governed by intent-based orders and standing Rules of Engagement, leaving 
the  details  of  execution  to  ordinary  soldiers,  who  are  expected  to  use  initiative  and 
judgment to accomplish the mission's goals (ibid., para. 1-145). This loose control over 
the application of deadly force, as well as its emphasis on using force pre-emptively to 
forestall possible risks of harm to soldiers, can have the effect of increasing soldiers’ use of 
violence, and produce consequent violent reprisals against the counter-insurgent forces. 
Condra et al. (2010), for example, found in their study of Afghanistan that attacks against 
International Security Assistance Forces [ISAF] were positively correlated with a recent 
ISAF attack against Afghan civilians. This dynamic can be expected to fuel the cycle of 
violent reprisals on both sides, further placing civilians in harm's way, entrenching the 
insurgency, and weakening the development of democratic and stable institutions.  
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The above discussion concerning the disaggregation and decentralisation of the chain-of-
command  in  present-day  security  forces  is  important  for  understanding  the 
transformations currently taking place in the customary law principle of distinction. The 
principle  of  distinction  that  asks  military  forces  to  distinguish  between  civilian  and 
military targets is one of the core principles of the customary laws of armed conflict. 
Traditionally,  combatants  have  been  distinguished  from  civilians  by  the  fact  that 
combatants fight within the military corps of a nation State and are subsumed under its 
chain-of-command,  as  demonstrated  by  such  characteristics  as  wearing  distinctive 
uniforms and insignia that are visible at a distance, carrying arms openly, being subsumed 
under a military chain-of-command, and conducting themselves in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war (Third Geneva Convention, 1949, Art. 4). These requirements 
lie  at  the  heart  of  the  principle  of  distinction,  as  the  use  of  armed  force  is  a  “core 
governance function” (Harel, 2010, p. 2) that involves the exertion of violence in the 
name of the public (ibid., p. 5), and hence cannot legitimately be exercised by private 
individuals and organisations.   
  Distinguishing those civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities – and 
are  therefore  liable  to  attack  –  has  become  a  significant  issue  in  international 
humanitarian law, due to the increasing confusion concerning distinguishing civilians in 
the  course  of  counter-terrorist  and  counter-insurgent  operations.  The  International 
Committee of the Red Cross’ Interpretive Guidance (Melzer, 2008) on this matter is in 
general agreement with what is stated in the U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual and in 
standard Rules of Engagement. The Interpretative Guidance notes that soldiers “run an 
increased risk of being attacked by persons they cannot distinguish from the civilian 
population” (Melzer, 2008, p. 994). Here, the distinction is drawn between civilians who 
are engaged in sporadic violence, and who are therefore liable to attack only for the time 
they are engaged in a specific hostile act (ibid., p. 995), and organised non-State armed 
groups. Such groups are taken to “constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the 
conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct 
part in hostilities (‘continuous combat function’)” (ibid.). As with soldiers, then, those 
individuals performing a continuous combat function may be lawful targets of attack at all 
times  (ibid.).  The  definition  of  ‘continuous  combat  function’  deliberately  excludes 
private contractors, who must be engaged in a specific act that directly contributes to the 
hostilities in order to be liable to attack (ibid.). The fact that private contractors are 
defined as a non-risky class of person demonstrates the extent to which private military 
contractors  have  been  re-interpreted  as  having  greater  protections  under  the 
international humanitarian law than ordinary combatants, who may be attacked at all Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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times. While the Interpretive Guidance states that all doubt must be resolved in favour of 
protecting  the  civilian  (ibid.,  p.  1009),  the  loose  definition  of  ‘continuous  combat 
function’ has nevertheless allowed the traditional criteria of attack to shift from one based 
upon identifying specific hostile acts, to a criteria based upon identifying a risky class of 
persons. Almost all civilians in a territory subject to counter-insurgent operations have 
thus come to be viewed as a risky class of persons, and particularly military-aged males. 
Moreover, the construction of what constitutes a specific hostile act has been widened to 
encompass even very low levels of risk.  
  The Interpretive Guidance has not solved the problem of distinguishing those 
civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities from those who are not. The U.S. 
Counterinsurgency  Field  Manual  recognises  that,  “in  COIN  environments, 
distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and often impossible” (Department 
of  the  Army,  Counterinsurgency  Field  Manual,  2006,  para.  7-40),  and  provides  no 
guidance on how this distinction should be made. Soldiers are no longer tasked with 
identifying specific hostile acts, but are instead now charged with assessing the possible 
“hostile  intent”  of  civilians,  defined  as  being  manifest  when  a  soldier  is  “reasonably 
perceived to be in danger” (Shupe, 2003). Soldiers are therefore now to identify and 
neutralise possible risks of future harm to themselves and their unit (800th Military 
Police  Brigade,  2003).  The  Counterinsurgency  Field  Manual  further  states  that 
“combatants are not required to take so much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit 
their lives” (Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2006, para. 7-
23). ‘Self-defense’ as a euphemism for risk management has become the primary criteria 
for assessing the lawfulness of military attacks on civilians, and it is individual soldiers who 
are tasked with assessing the hostile intentions of the surrounding civilians in the conflict 
zone. The institutional objective here is to shift risk away from security forces and onto 
the civilian population.  
  Standing Rules of Engagement strongly emphasise the soldier's inherent right 
of self-defense (Perry, 1999, p. 13). For example, a declassified Rule of Engagement for 
the 800th Military Police Brigade in Iraq states in bold letters at the top of the page – 
which is the standard format of expressing the intent of an order – that “Nothing in these 
rules limits your inherent authority and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate 
action to defend yourself, your unit, and other US forces”. The order goes on to state, “Do 
not target, except in self-defense, civilians, protected sites (i.e. hospitals, places of worship, 
schools, cultural institutions), or civilian infrastructure” (800th Military Police Brigade, 
2003). Yet the ‘reasonableness’ standard appears nowhere in this order, and in the danger 
and confusion of a conflict zone the U.S. military has shown itself willing to tolerate very 
permissive criteria and very subjective feelings on the part of their soldiers as to whether 
they perceive a hostile intent before using lethal force. This is, indeed, what happened 
when U.S. soldiers decided to use lethal force against a group of civilians on 12 July 2007 How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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in New Baghdad. 
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On 5 April 2010, WikiLeaks released the video footage that it entitled Collateral Murder. 
The footage was widely reported and discussed in the media, and has resulted in the U.S. 
military detaining and charging PFC Bradley Manning with its unauthorised release. The 
events  depicted  in  the  video,  and  the  discourse  surrounding  them,  demonstrate  the 
extent to which the neoliberal ideologies of security governance have justified the killings 
as being lawful under the customary principle of distinction. The footage depicts events 
that occurred on 12 July 2007 in the suburb of New Baghdad in which U.S. forces killed 
perhaps twelve Iraqis. The exact figure is disputed, but it ranges from eleven to sixteen 
persons, including two Reuters news agency employees, and the serious wounding of two 
children.  
  The day began for the U.S. soldiers with a ‘cordon and search’ operation, which 
is a standard counter-insurgent tactic in which soldiers cordon off an urban area and 
search all houses door-to-door looking for weapons, explosives, and other contraband. As 
they prepared to leave, the soldiers were hit by sniper fire from a nearby rooftop. Two 
Apache  attack  helicopters  were  called  in  to  “clear”  the  area  of  insurgents  (McCord, 
2011). The soldiers in the Apache identify a group of military-aged males on a street, two 
of whom were reportedly armed, and they call in the air strike over their radio to their 
commander (First Air Cavalry Brigade, Collateral Murder, 2007, 0:30 et seq.). It was later 
revealed that this group included the two Reuters employees, whose camera equipment 
was possibly mistaken for a weapon. An AK-47 and an RPG launcher were reportedly 
later found at the scene (First Air Cavalry Brigade, Memorandum, 2007). The video itself 
depicts an individual with what may be an AK-47 slung around his arm, hanging down, 
walking  in  a  calm  manner  and  talking  with  another  member  of  the  group.  Another 
individual is seen with what appears to be a weapon, possibly an RPG, crouching down 
and looking around the corner in a defensive manner and then returning to the group. 
The footage does not reveal weapons or hostile actions being directed towards the U.S. 
forces, nor that the individuals were aware of the presence of the U.S. Apache helicopters 
flying overhead. The footage itself does not provide evidence that these individuals were 
involved in the earlier small arms fire incident, nor that the soldiers were aware of any 
such evidence in making their decision to engage. Simply appearing to carry weapons in 
an area near which U.S. soldiers had recently come under fire was thus seen by the Air 
Cavalry Brigade as exhibiting a ‘hostile intent’ sufficient to warrant the application of 
deadly force.  
  A few minutes after this group was strafed with gunfire, a civilian van stops at 
the curb to assist one of the wounded men, which was later discovered to be one of the Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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Reuters employees. A man in white exits the vehicle, and a voice, speaking English and 
most likely of an American, can be heard over the radio saying, ‘We need a doctor’ (First 
Air Cavalry Brigade, Collateral Murder, 2007, 7:47 et seq.). A soldier in the Apache, 
codename  ‘Crazyhorse  18’,  explains  over  the  radio  to  his  commander,  ‘Bushmaster 
Seven’, that someone has come to pick up the wounded and the bodies, and requests 
permission to engage (ibid., 7:55 et seq.). The following is the exchange between the 
soldier and his commander: 
 
  BUSHMASTER:  Picking up the wounded? 
  CRAZYHORSE:  Yeah, we're trying to get permission to engage. 
  UNKNOWN:  Come on let us shoot. 
CRAZYHORSE:  We have a black SUV, uh Bongo truck picking up the 
    bodies. Request permission to engage. 
  BUSHMASTER:   This is BUSHMASTER SEVEN. Roger. Engage. 
 
The two children who would be wounded were sitting in the front seat of the SUV. A 
short while later in the footage, a U.S. tank drives over the body of one of the Iraqis and 
the soldiers treat the incident quite lightly. It is quite clear from the video that the U.S. 
soldiers perceived the individuals assisting the wounded to be manifesting a hostile intent 
simply on that basis. This would seem to be a strikingly permissive interpretation of a 
‘hostile intent’.  
  Interpreting the act of coming to the assistance of wounded on the battlefield 
as manifesting a ‘hostile intent’ appears at first to be a departure from the customary law 
as  set  down  in  the  Geneva  Conventions,  particularly  that  which  protects  persons 
providing humanitarian assistance to the dead and wounded on the battlefield. Even 
those who are clearly combatants but who are engaged in humanitarian activities are, for 
that time, considered hors de combat, and are not lawful targets of attack (Third Geneva 
Convention, 1949, Common Art. 3(2)). Humanitarian law stipulates that the “wounded 
and sick shall be collected and cared for” (ibid.). The First Geneva Convention states, 
“The military authorities shall permit the inhabitants and relief societies, even in invaded 
or occupied areas, spontaneously to collect and care for wounded or sick of whatever 
nationality... No one may ever be molested or convicted for having nursed the wounded 
or sick” (First Geneva Convention, 1949, Art. 18). Article 15 further states that, “At all 
times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, 
take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick, to protect them 
against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead 
and prevent their being despoiled” (ibid., Art. 15). The suffering of the wounded at the 
Battle of Solferino of 24 June 1859, was the genesis for the founding of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the origins of humanitarian law, as embodied in the How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded Armies in the Field of 
1864.  Violations  of  these  prohibitions  are  considered  grave  breaches  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005). It would appear, then, 
that justifications based upon risk management are coming to trump more traditional 
interpretations of the laws of war. Moreover, the footage shows that the decision as to 
whether a hostile intent was manifest was left to the individual soldiers, who – in an 
inversion  of  the  traditional  chain-of-command  –  are  here  collecting  the  relevant 
information and initiating the engagement. Their decision is merely ratified by those 
higher  up  in  the  chain-of-command,  which  is  in  line  with  neoliberal  ‘New  Public 
Management’  reforms  to  the  military  chain-of-command  that  are  now  increasingly 
typical. 
  The First Air Cavalry Brigade conducted an investigation of the incident and 
published their findings exonerating the soldiers involved a mere seven days later (First 
Air  Cavalry  Brigade,  Memorandum,  2007).  The  Memorandum  finds  the  soldiers’ 
conduct to be lawful under the customary laws of war and the Air Cavalry Brigade’s own 
standing Rules of Engagement. The Memorandum states that “a black van arrived to 
retrieve one of the wounded insurgents. Crazyhorse 18 requested immediate clearance to 
engage the van, received it, and completely disabled the vehicle within seconds” (ibid., p. 
2).  The  Memorandum  goes  on  to  state  that  the  soldiers  involved  “exercised  sound 
judgment and discrimination during attempts to acquire insurgents, or moreover, to 
identify personnel engaged in hostile or threatening activities against our Brothers on the 
ground” (ibid.). The customary principle of distinction is here re-conceived in terms of 
the inherent right to self-defense, as determined by the personal judgment of the attack 
team: “Fundamental to all engagements is the principle of military necessity. This was 
clearly established and supported by the friendly forces (sic) inherent right to self defense 
and the ground commander’s obligation to ensure all necessary means were employed to 
defend or protect his Soldiers from hostile acts” (ibid.). Being a military aged male in a 
‘cordon and search’ zone and possibly carrying a weapon was seen as sufficient evidence 
of a hostile intent, warranting the application of lethal force against civilians. Lt. Col. Scott 
Bleichwehl, spokesperson for the multinational forces in Baghdad, was widely reported in 
the media as saying, “There is no question that coalition forces were clearly engaged in 
combat  operations  against  a  hostile  force”  (See  eg.  Bumiller,  2010).  The  pattern  of 
killings seen in Collateral Murder is strikingly similar to the manner in which U.S. soldiers 
killed sixteen civilians in Haditha, Iraq, during a house-clearing operation in the aftermath 
of a roadside bomb that killed a U.S. soldier. The attacks would therefore appear to be in 
line with broader neoliberal strategies of governance  and the decentralisation  of the 
chain-of-command, and the U.S. military clearly justified the soldiers’ actions along these 
lines. Indeed, both the risks of the occupation as a whole and those of the ‘cordon and 
search’  operation  carried  out  that  day  were  staged  and  managed  by  the  U.S.  forces Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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themselves.  
  However, such justifications for the intentional killing of civilians based on risk 
management  are  not  particular  to  this  incident,  and  are  coming  to  stand  alongside 
‘collateral  damage’  as  one  of  the  most  proffered  justifications  for  killing  civilians. 
Moreover, these modes of justification are not limited to U.S. counter-insurgent actions 
in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  For  example,  the  same  basic  move  has  been  used  by  the 
government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to justify the killing of protestors in Syria. 
The political and media adviser to President Assad, Dr. Bouthaina Shaaban, explained the 
killing of several civilians to the Syrian Arab News Agency by stating that smugglers and 
gunmen had seized arms from a police station and opened fire on a military checkpoint. 
Soldiers killed them in “self-defense”, she said (Quoted in Dalje.com, 2011). Self-defense 
was also used as a justification by Muammar Qaddafi, whose son, Seif al-Islam summed 
up the logic at work quite well when he stated in the early days of the uprising that no one 
ordered troops to fire on protestors; rather, “The guards were surprised by the attacking 
people  and they  (started) ... firing. They don't need an  order to  defend themselves” 
(Quoted in Sawyer, 2011). It was simultaneously used by NATO forces supporting the 
National Transitional Council, when a Pentagon spokesperson stated in April 2011 that 
the  NATO  airstrikes  against  Libyans  were  “defensive  in  nature”,  and  so  were  not 
considered even to be “strikes” by the military (Quoted in Irish Times, 2011).  
  ‘Self-defense’ as a euphemism for risk management and pre-emptive killing has 
also  been  used  by  a  variety  of  security  forces  the  world  over  in  justifying  violence 
committed against political protestors. In the early days of the Tunisian uprising, for 
example,  a  spokesperson  for  the  Interior  Ministry  explained  the  deaths  of  fourteen 
protestors, stating, “The police fired in the air but the crowds continued, and the police 
acted out of legitimate self-defence” (BBC News, 2011). The European Court of Human 
Rights  has  recently  found  that  Italy  has  not  violated  its  international  obligations  in 
holding an Italian police officer not liable for the killing of a demonstrator at the 2001 G8 
Summit in Genoa, on the grounds that the use of lethal force can be justified when it is 
“absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence” (European Court 
of  Human  Rights,  Guiliani  &  Gaggio  vs.  Italy,  2011,  para.  307).  In  this  case,  the 
demonstrator was attempting to throw a fire extinguisher at the police vehicle (ibid.). 
Neoliberal strategies of risk management have thus gained ground in the European Court 
of Human Rights, as well. However, the concept of ‘unlawful violence’ used by the Court 
does not include an assessment of the legality of the force used by security personnel, nor 
whether  civilians  would  have  an  inherent  right  of  self-defence  against  such  unlawful 
violence (see McMahan, 2009, p. 14).  
  International peacekeeping forces have also recently used similar justifications. 
This  is  a  marked  departure  from  the  Balkan  conflict  when  peacekeeping  forces 
notoriously  stood  aside  while  war  crimes  were  committed  against  civilians  at  the How Atrocity Becomes Law, Dowdeswell (pp. 30-56) 
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Dutchbat Compound at Potočari prior to the massacre at Srebrenica; intervention then 
would  have  violated  their  then  peacekeeping  Rules  of  Engagement  (UN  Secretary 
General, The Fall of Srebrenica, 1999). Much has changed since that time, though, as 
exemplified  by  the  NATO-led  KFOR  peacekeeping  force  in  Kosovo  and  its  actions 
during the 27 September 2011 border clashes at Jarinje, during which KFOR forces 
engaged  Serbian  protestors  with  rubber  bullets.  KFOR  spokesperson  Kai  Gudenoge 
stated  to  Agence  France-Presse  in  Pristina,  that  “(Serbs)  threw  stones  on  German 
soldiers. One soldier was hit and the troops were forced to fire non-lethal rounds in self-
defence”  (Quoted  in  EUbusiness,  2011).  Rather  than  being  unchanging  and 
unchangeable, then, the international customary laws of war have in fact been noticeably 
transformed since the time of Srebrenica, and even since the UN Secretary General's 
Report on that incident of 1999. This is particularly striking when one remembers that 
the Serbian military itself used the very same justifications of pre-emption, self-defence, 
and military necessity that we saw in the U.S. Memorandum that justified the killings in 
New  Baghdad.  The  international  community's  negative  response  to  the  Srebrenica 
incident most likely helped these justifications to achieve the acceptance that they have 
among international leaders and diplomats.  The changes to the military command and 
control structure that began in a piecemeal fashion after World War II, and which gained 
traction with the rise of neoliberal forms of management in the 1980s and 1990s, have – 
since the counter-insurgent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – taken over an ever-
larger swath of the security apparatus and have transformed the customs of war to the 
point where atrocity has become law.  
 
Conclusion  Conclusion  Conclusion  Conclusion     
    
The principle of distinction under the customary laws of armed conflict requires that 
security forces distinguish between civilian and military targets, but this is now being 
reconfigured as a principle that permits security personnel to use force pre-emptively 
whenever they perceive there to be a risk of harm to themselves or to their colleagues. 
With the ‘inherent right of self-defense’ taking over the principle of distinction, there has 
been  a  significant  weakening  of  protections  for  civilians  versus  combatants  in  their 
liability to be attacked in the conflict zone. The Statist view of the laws of armed conflict 
has long justified the use of armed force as part of the sovereign prerogative, so long as it 
emanates  from  a  legitimate  public  authority,  yet  there  is  very  little  that  can  be 
characterised as 'public' in this sense about the individualised and privatised methods of 
self-interest and self-defence with which security personnel are now making decisions to 
employ lethal force. This collapse of the public/private distinction that has long been the 
central organising logic of the laws of armed conflict is not only leaving us with a legal 
vacuum vis-à-vis the protection of civilians, but has also effectively created a vacuum in Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 6 (2013) 
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the fundamental legal justifications for the use of armed force ab origine. Moreover, 
neoliberal ideologies of governance – and the practices used to enforce these ideologies 
on the ground – have not only generated this vacuum, but have also made use of it to 
produce plausible legal justifications for the commission of atrocities.  
Hitherto, the international humanitarian law has enjoyed a certain degree of 
moral force, and this has given it at least some power in the discourse surrounding the 
killing of civilians in war.  However, neoliberal ideologies of security governance have the 
potential to dissolve the international humanitarian law from the inside out, and it will 
progressively lose its moral force the more it is used to justify atrocities against civilians. 
Furthermore, if the state has given away its monopoly on the legitimate use of force – 
what has long formed the basis of the laws of armed conflict – then there appears little left 
to justify either that force or the laws that purport to regulate it. All of this leaves us at 
somewhat of a crossroads as far as the customary laws of armed conflict are concerned. 
There is the potential either for us to wind up squarely in the realm of imperial power 
politics, backed up by an ever-growing and increasingly empowered security apparatus, 
or for us to open up new avenues to wholly de-legitimate the use of force as a tool of 
international relations in the global age.  
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